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Undemocratic governments are at risk of 
creating a geopolitical void in central 
Europe. By antagonizing fellow 
European states in NATO and the EU, 
at a time when the US is less than fully 
invested in these institutions, they are 
isolating themselves. By artificially 
stirring anti-EU feeling they are 
rendering their citizens more vulnerable 
to Russian propaganda. In a worst-case 
scenario, these states might end up 
detached from the West, and entering 
into a geopolitical limbo. 
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The European Economic Community (EEC) 
started off as a small club of just six 
democratic states. NATO, originally, was less 
squeamish about values, in spite of the 
reference to “democracy, individual liberty and 
the rule of law” in the preamble to the 
Washington Treaty. The authoritarian Portugal 
of Salazar was a founding member in 1949. 
Greece and Turkey have been allies since 1952, 
even as they went through periods of 
authoritarianism. Strategic necessity trumped 
values. That assessment began to evolve with 
the accession of Spain to NATO in 1982, and 
of Spain and Portugal to the EEC in 1986, 
following the democratization of both 
countries. The end of the Cold War definitely 
changed things: democracy now is a strategic 
necessity. The consolidation of democracy in 
central and eastern Europe has become a key 
objective of NATO and EU enlargement.  
 
So what do NATO and the EU do when 
some of their members revert back to 
authoritarianism?  
 
That the governments of Hungary and Poland 
are, at the very least, weakening democracy in 
their countries is beyond doubt. The EU has 
repeatedly identified specific policies that 
violate democratic principles. Other member 
states are at risk of evolving in a similar 
direction. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor 
Orbán has stated himself that he seeks to 
construct an “illiberal democracy”. Obviously, 
no such thing exists. Whatever populists 
claim: the choice is between democratic and 
non-democratic government.   
 
POPULISM AND NATO  
This authoritarian trend, which affects other 
countries too, creates a fundamental problem 
for NATO, because it is at odds with how its 
basic purpose has evolved since the end of the 
Cold War. The purpose of NATO today is to 
defend not just the territorial integrity of its 
members, but also the model of society that 
they have constructed on their territories. In 
European society, the state is to guarantee 
 2 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
security, prosperity, and democracy for its 
citizens. This triad cannot be disentangled: a 
citizen can only benefit from security, 
prosperity and democracy together or not at 
all. Security from violence doesn’t mean much 
if one dies of hunger, just as wealth doesn’t 
mean much if the government can take it 
away, or even imprison you, arbitrarily.  
 
If an ally no longer upholds this European way 
of life, then what exactly is NATO supposed 
to defend? A government that undermines its 
country’s democracy thus ipso facto puts its 
security at risk too. The more authoritarian a 
government becomes, the more it puts the 
bond of solidarity in the Alliance into 
question. To put it very starkly: which 
democratic government could justify to its 
citizens putting its forces in harm’s way in 
order to defend an eventual dictatorship in 
another NATO country?  
 
This, of course, is obvious to NATO’s 
potential adversaries too. Russia definitely will 
not hesitate to use any opportunity that 
presents itself in order to weaken NATO, if 
only to stop the Alliance from interfering in its 
strategic design of re-establishing 
predominance in the former Soviet republics. 
Hence Russia actively supports various 
populist actors.  
 
POPULISM AND THE EU  
In most cases, populist tactics include Euro-
scepticism. It is both acceptable and necessary 
in a democratic polity to criticise EU policies, 
and even the EU project as such. But when 
countries decided, by democratic means, to 
join the EU, they subscribed to a set of 
objectives and limitations. If a government no 
longer is willing to abide by them, it cannot 
expect that its country’s status in the EU will 
remain unaffected, even if such were the free 
and informed democratic choice of its citizens 
(which today is questionable). Therefore, if the 
EU adopts sanctions against a government 
that violates the basic principles that it 
subscribed to when joining the Union, this 
does not constitute a violation of the 
sovereignty of the state in question.  
 
But certain governments not only violate the 
EU’s values, they also actively undermine EU 
policies, notably the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). What is worse, they 
appear to be doing so under the influence of 
foreign powers such as Russia and China. In 
full contradiction with their nationalist 
rhetoric, some governments have willingly 
become instruments of outside actors. 
Worryingly, not only proto-authoritarian but 
even some fully democratic governments are 
undermining the EU in this way, having 
become hostage, it seems, to Russian energy or 
Chinese financial power. As a result, it has 
become increasingly difficult for the EU to 
take a resolute and united stance in issues 
involving China and Russia. Certain 
governments even undermine EU positions on 
general human rights policy, directly affecting 
the core of the Union’s value-based foreign 
policy.  
 
The risk is that at some point other EU 
countries will stop investing in a foreign policy, 
and other policies, at 28, and forge ahead in a 
core group. A multispeed EU is in the offing 
anyway, and it is the (suboptimal) solution if 
there is no other way to advance European 
integration (and it must advance, for there still 
are areas in which only a stronger EU role can 
safeguard the national interest of the member 
states). But a multispeed EU should be a 
positive choice, a way of moving ahead with a 
view to all member states re-joining the core 
eventually. It should not be a negative choice, a 
way of casting aside those that have come to 
be seen as obstacles to progress. That would 
create long-lasting acrimony from which the 
EU might not recover.  
 
NATO and the EU can no longer be 
disentangled. If one weakens the bond 
between nations in the EU, ipso facto one 
weakens ties in NATO. Or do proto-
authoritarian governments really think that 
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they can constantly frustrate other EU 
member states, and yet those same states will 
come running to their assistance through 
NATO when they are in need? Today, there 
can no longer be a strong and united NATO 
without a strong and united EU. Thus, 
undermining the EU undermines collective 
defence just as much as undermining 
democracy does.  
 
A GEOPOLITICAL VOID  
The governments concerned may think that 
they can always count on the US to protect 
them. But how certain can they be? In July 
2017 president Trump happily let himself be 
fêted in Warsaw and in his speech even 
seemed to support the Polish government 
against “bureaucracy” – a thinly veiled 
reference to the EU. But just a week later he 
made his appearance as the glowing guest star 
at the Bastille Day celebrations in Paris, where 
president Macron will have given him a totally 
opposite view of the EU.  
 
Even without the suspicion surrounding 
Trump’s links to Russia, it hardly seems wise 
to put one’s faith in a president who chose a 
campaign slogan that originated with extreme 
right isolationists in the 1930s: “America 
First”. Under the Trump administration, the 
US has increased its military presence on the 
eastern borders of NATO. But given Trump’s 
less than enthusiastic views on institutions 
such as NATO and the EU, and his apparent 
links with Russia, can he really be counted 
upon to counterbalance Russian attempts to 
unravel these organisations and to gain major 
influence in specific central European 
countries (by other than military means)? 
Especially if some of the European 
governments concerned seem to have de facto 
enabled Russia themselves?  
 
What anti-EU, undemocratic governments are 
at risk of doing, therefore, is to slowly create a 
geopolitical void in central Europe. By 
antagonizing fellow European states in NATO 
and the EU, at a time when the US is less than 
fully invested in Europe’s institutions, they are 
actually isolating themselves. At the same time, 
by artificially stirring anti-EU feeling they are 
rendering their citizens more vulnerable to 
Russian propaganda. In a worst-case scenario, 
these states might end up detached from the 
West, and entering into the same geopolitical 
limbo as Ukraine, an uncomfortable buffer 
zone between the West and Russia. This is 
probably not what citizens in Poland and 
Hungary have in mind.  
 
The consequences may not be limited to the 
current proto-authoritarian states. If 
authoritarianism is not stopped, it may well 
affect ever more European states. Already, the 
existence of proto-authoritarian regimes within 
the EU has greatly undermined the legitimacy 
and effectiveness of EU foreign policy. It may 
well end up paralysing EU decision-making 
altogether and, consequently, cause the flight 
ahead, if not the break-away, of the remaining 
democratic member states. At that point the 
cohesion of NATO too will crumble. What is 
more, authoritarian tendencies in Europe and 
in the US may become mutually reinforcing. 
Many American observers fear similar 
developments in the US as are now happening 
in Poland and Hungary. In a reversal of 
history, a strong democratic EU can act as a 
beacon for democratic forces in the US. But a 
divided and less and less democratic EU and 
US may end up pulling each other down.  
 
This is a dark scenario, but not an impossible 
one, which is why NATO and the EU have to 
guard against it.  
 
NATO-EU COOPERATION  
Preventing a geopolitical void in the heart of 
Europe and halting the spread of 
authoritarianism is a really strategic challenge 
for NATO-EU cooperation. It calls for a 
degree of common strategizing that goes much 
beyond what NATO-EU cooperation 
envisages today.  
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The EU has awoken to the challenge, be it 
belatedly. The European Commission is 
keeping up the pressure on governments that 
violate the Treaties, including, most recently, 
by proposing to leverage financial support in 
the next Multi-Annual Financial Framework 
for the EU’s budgetary period 2021-2028. 
Sanctions may be counter-productive to some 
extent at first, as people may unite behind their 
national government, but the alternative is to 
let the rot spread. NATO too should 
communicate much more firmly with its 
member states: NATO commitments amount 
to a lot more than spending 2% of GDP on 
defence. Democracy is as important, if not 
more, to merit the solidarity expressed by 
Article 5.  
 
Sanctions alone are not enough, however. The 
West must have a positive story to tell and, 
even more importantly, concrete new 
achievements to underpin it. First and 
foremost, the EU must have convincing 
policies that are seen to directly benefit the 
security, democratic rights, and prosperity of 
every individual citizen. People must 
understand that in reality neither Russia nor 
any other outside actor has anything to offer to 
a citizen of the EU. Or would anybody opt for 
a Russian pension plan? This means 
investment in the economy, but it probably 
also means that a new deal in European social 
policy is the indispensable bulwark against 
foreign intrusion. The national welfare states 
that ensure the equality of European citizens, 
and thus the cohesion of European societies 
and the stability of European politics, must be 
ensured at the EU level, and visibly so. This is 
of major importance for all EU member states, 
for as elections in France, Germany and Italy 
have shown, nobody is immune against the 
lure of populism.  
 
Finally, EU institutions must be strengthened 
as well. Specifically, unanimous decision-
making on foreign policy (CFSP, not defence 
or CSDP) should be abandoned in favour of 
decisions by qualified majority voting. 
Individual member states will then no longer 
be able to weaken European diplomacy for 
their narrow short-term benefit, but to the 
long-term detriment of all. That’s the essence 
of the Union: giving up on individual short-
term interests guarantees everyone’s interests 
in the long-term.   
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